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COMMENTS
Usury Law in North Carolina
INTRODUCTION
"[T] he usury ceiling.., threatens to pinch the Tar Heel economy,"
says a North Carolina newspaper in advocating a "rewriting [of] North
Carolina's usury laws."' This editorial comment epitomizes the current
furor about general usury' laws, which purport to fix a maximum cost
for credit but which fail to deal adequately with the realities of the market
place. A recent "credit crunch" 3 has made both business borrowers and
home buyers aware that the usury laws of the past are ill-suited to a credit
economy. The consumer has found that usury statutes offer him little
protection.4 This comment will examine North Carolina's statutory and
judicial usury law through an exposition of its present state and a critique
of its present value.
HISTORY
Although usury is a topic of much currency, laws regulating the price
of money are by no means of recent origin. The Kingdom of Eshunna in
Mesopotamia limited interest to 16% percent per annum in 2000 B.C.5
Under Mosaic law, any return upon property loaned to a fellow believer
'Raleigh (N.C.) News and Observer, Feb. 11, 1969, at 4, col. 1. See also Char-
lotte (N.C.) Observer, Jan. 15, 1969, § C, at 2, col. 1.
' "Interest" is defined as the compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties
for the use or forbearance of money. Brown v. Hialts, 82 U.S. 177 (1872). "Usury"
is the taking or reserving of an illegal profit for the use of money. MacRackan v.
Bank of Columbus, 164 N.C. 24, 80 S.E. 184 (1913). The Restatement of Contracts
defines a usurious bargain as one "under which a greater profit than is permitted
by law is paid, or is agreed to be paid to a creditor by or on behalf of the debtor
for a loan of money, or for extending the maturity of a pecuniary debt .... " RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 526 (1932).
'With the cost of funds rising, banks raised the prime loan rate that they charge
their best corporate borrowers to seven percent in January, 1969. Financial Develop-
ients in the Fourth Quarter of 1968, FEDERAL RESERVE BULL., Feb. 1969, at 96.
"[M]arket interest rates rose sharply in the fourth quarter of 1968, reaching new
record highs in many cases by around year-end." Id. 89
"See, e.g., NORTH CAROLINA CONSUMER COUNCIL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE
COST OF CREDIT (1969).
' Shanks, Practical Problems in the Application of Archaic Usury Laws, 53 VA.
L. REV. 327, & n.5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Shanks].
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was forbidden.0 Restrictions placed upon interest-taking by the medieval
Christian church approached absolute prohibition. Usurers were adjudged
guilty of a mortal sin and excommunicated as loans were regarded as help
owed one's neighbor rather than as tools of trade. During the Renais-
sance a new concern for commercial expediency demanded a modification
of canon law. Compensation for loans was first allowed only as reimburse-
ment for the loss of money's use. The Protestant Reformation added im-
petus to the trend. In 1547, Calvin fixed the maximum interest rate for
Geneva at five percent per annum. 7
Interest was allowed in seventeenth-century England only upon a
strictly regulated basis. The statute 12 Anne c. 168 served as the prototype
for usury statutes in the American colonies. North Carolina's first usury
law, the Act of 1741, rendered "utterly void 'all bonds, contracts, and
assurances whatsoever,... for the payment of any principal or money to
be lent... upon or for any usury, whereupon there shall be reserved or
taken' interest in excess of the legal rate prescribed."' This act was
superseded by the Act of 1876-77, which constitutes a substantial part of
the present North Carolina general usury statute.Y No longer is a usurious
contract wholly void. The statutory penalty is now forfeiture of all in-
terest reserved by the lender or twice the amount of interest actually paid
by the borrower."
' "Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money, usury of vic-
tuals, usury of anything. . . ." Deuteronomy 23:19-20 (King James). This theme
was expanded in the New Testament: "[L]end, hoping for nothing thereby." Luke
6:35 (King James).
"See generally B. DEMPSEY, INTEREST AND USURY (1943) ; S. HOMER, A. His-
TORY OF INTEREST RATES (1963) ; F. RYAN, USURY AND USURY LAWS 25-32 (1924).
8 12 Anne c. 16 (1714) is quoted at n.11, Comment, Usury Laws and the Cor-
porate Exception, 23 MD. L. REv. 51, 52 (1963).
'Commercial Credit Corp. v. Robeson Motors, Inc., 243 N.C. 236, 330, 90 S.E.2d
886, 889 (1956), quoting Act of 1741, Potter's Revisal of 1819, ch. 28.
'
0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1964). In Merchants' & Farmers' Nat'l Bank v.
Myers, 74 N.C. 514 (1875), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the state
usury statute did not apply to national banks, basing its opinion on Farmers' &
Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29 (1875). Therefore, the General
Assembly enacted legislation (Laws of 1876-1877, ch. 91) substantially the same
as that applicable to national banks under federal statute 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1967).
See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Robeson Motors, Inc., 243 N.C. 326, 90 S.E.2d
886 (1956).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1964) states:
[T]he taking, receiving, reserving or charging a greater rate of interest than
six per centum per annum . . . when knowingly done, shall be a forfeiture
of the entire interest which the evidence of debt carries with it .... And in
case a greater rate of interest has been paid, the person or his legal repre-
sentatives ... may recover back twice the amount of interest paid ....
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From a moral doctrine of canon law, interest regulation evolved into
an exercise of police power intended to protect "the needy borrower, a
victim of the rapacious lender."' 2 The concept of overreaching has played
a particularly important part in the justification of general usury laws,
which have long been under attack from the laissez-faire economists" and
businessmen. This justification, however, has little basis in fact. Because
general usury statutes fail to discriminate realistically as to what and to
whom they apply, they have been termed "blunt instruments of social
control. Unrefined and clumsy, they are also ineffective."' 4
The central questions implicit in the usury debate are: (1) Which
borrowers really need protection from "rapacious lenders"? (2) To what
extent can interest rates be effectively regulated in a modern credit system?
The existing statutory and case law furnishes no viable answers. Faced
with a single fixed maximum interest rate applicable in all credit situations,
the legislatures and the courts have eschewed thorough reform in favor of
haphazard ad hoc exceptions. Indeed, the general usury law is now hon-
ored more in the legal exception than in the observance.
THE STATUTES
"Existing state legislation regulating maximum interest rates is
typically a jumble of statutes fixing a basic usury rate and then exempting
from the basic rate"' 5 various lenders and particular types of loans. This
is particularly true of North Carolina legislation.'" Interest regulations
are found in North Carolina General Statutes, Chapters 24, Interest; 53,
Banks; and 54, Co-operative Organizations.' 7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1
" Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 340, 132 S.E2d 692, 695(1963), quoting with approval GMAC v. Weinrich, 262 S.W. 425 (Mo. 1924).
13 One of the most effective attacks was by utilitarian economist Jeremy Bentham,
who contended that "no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely and with
his eyes open, ought to be hindered ... from making such bargain, in the way of
obtaining money, as he thinks fit.... ." J. BENTHAM, DEFENSE OF UsURY, quoted
it S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 81 (1963).
4 Shanks 329.
" Benfield, Money, Mortgages and Migraine-the Usury Headache, 19 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 819, 835 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Benfield]. For a synopsis
of existing state credit law, see CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE or P-H CREDIT
UNION GUIDE.
" "Usury is not illegal at common law, but is made so by statute in most of the
United States as to some or all kinds of loans." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 526,
Introductory Note (1932).
"? N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-201 (1965) provides that nothing in Article 9 of the
U.C.C. shall validate any charge or practice illegal under the usury laws. Article
9 does not, therefore, create any exceptions to the general usury statute.
1969]
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(1964) sets the legal rate of interest at "six per cent per annum for such
time as interest may accrue and no more." Exceptions"' to this rate, set
forth in Chapter 24, are worded as exemptions from the legal rate; how-
ever, exceptions found in other chapters are phrased as grants of corporate
power, with no reference to the general usury statute. Though the ques-
tion has never been litigated, these grants of power have been generally
regarded as in pari inateria with the usury statute 0 and, therefore, as
exemptions from its coverage. This interpretation is consistent with
legislative intent that these positive extensions of corporate power serve
as "escape valves" to release the pressures exerted upon the interest
ceiling by an expanding economy.
20
Certain Institutional Lenders
The most important of the exceptions expanding corporate power is
that allowing commercial banks, savings and loan associations, and in-
dustrial banks to deduct in advance from the proceeds of a loan interest
18 There is some question about the constitutionality of the exemption of certain
classes of lenders or borrowers from the general usury statute. N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 7 provides that "[n]o person or set of persons are entitled to exclusive or
separate emoluments or privileges from the community . . . ." In holding that
certain legislation did not exempt insurance companies from the six percent rate
limit, the North Carolina Supreme Court said in Cowan v. Security Life & Trust Co.,
211 N.C. 18, 188 S.E. 812 (1936), that "if the effect of [the legislation] is to
exempt insurance companies from [the general usury statute] . . . and thereby to
authorize insurance companies to charge, retain, or receive interest on loans . . .
at a greater rate of interest than six per centum per annum, this contention [of
unconstitutionality] must be sustained." Id. at 21, 188 S.E. at 814. See also
Rowland v. Building and Loan Ass'n, 116 N.C. 877, 22 S.E. 8 (1895) (General
Assembly has no power to grant exceptions to the general usury statute) ; Simonton
v. Lanier, 71 N.C. 498 (1874) (General Assembly cannot grant special privileges
in a bank's charter). Other cases, however, apparently recognize exceptions to the
usury statute although they do not involve the constitutional issue. See, e.g.,
Huski-Bilt, Inc. v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 271 N.C. 662, 157 S.E.2d 352
(1967); Kornegay v. City of Goldsboro, 180 N.C. 441, 105 S.E. 187 (1920). State
v. Glidden, 228 N.C. 664, 46 S.E.2d 860 (1948), recognizes that valid classifica-
tions can be made under Art. I, § 7 if they are based on reasonable distinctions;
however, this decision did not involve the usury statutes.
1" See, e.g., Poyner, Some Practical Aspects of the North Carolina Law of Usury,
12 N.C. BAR NOTES 3 (1960).
20 For an explanation of how the price of money is determined in the credit
market, see Benfield 826-828. See also Merrimen & Hanks, Revising Usury Statutes
in Light of a Tight Money Market, 27 MD. L. REv. 1 (1967). For a discussion of
the various legal responses to economic pressures upon interest limits, see Shanks
331-34. According to Shanks, the major devices used to soften the impact of general
usury laws are: (1) to raise the maximum rate well above normal market price
levels; (2) to reduce penalties for violation; (3) to enact a corporate exception; and
(4) to have the courts recognize the "time price" doctrine exempting credit sales.
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up to six percent per annum upon the entire principal. The interest may
be "discounted" and computed on the entire principal even though the
loan is to be repaid in installments.2 Therefore, if a qualified lender makes
a one thousand dollar loan to be repaid in twelve monthly installments
and deducts sixty dollars interest from the proceeds in advance, he
lawfully reaps a return of approximately 11.8 percent simple annual in-
terest. The interest rate quoted to the borrower is "six percent."
Commercial banks and industrial banks are also authorized to charge,
in connection with these loans, fixed fees based on the amount loaned. 2
This authorization has been widely interpreted by lenders to mean that
such fees may be charged in addition to six percent interest. While the
statute does not explicitly state 3 an exception to the general usury law
for expense fees, the accepted interpretation is justified in light of decisions
from other jurisdictions. The general rule is that fees are not considered
interest so long as they furnish consideration for collateral services per-
formed by the lender rather than consideration for the loan.2 - Examples
of allowable fees are those for a credit report, title examination, drafting,
and inspection of real property. Fees chargeable under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 53-141 (1964) are "to cover expenses, including any examination of
the character and circumstances of the borrower . . . ." This language
apparently contemplates application of the general rule. If fees according
to the statutory schedule be also deducted in advance from the one thousand
21 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-43(6) (1964) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-141(3)
(1964) must be construed together in order to see the whole of this exception,
which extends to commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations,
trust companies and industrial banks, whether they operate under federal or state
charter, and to no other lenders. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-43(6) (1964) limits savings
and loan associations in exercising the powers granted therein to loans of less than
three years duration and less than fifteen hundred dollars in amount. The prac-
tice of deducting interest in advance is known as "discounting" or "add-on" and is
discussed fully, infra.
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-141 (1964), granting the fee privilege to industrial
banks, is incorporated by reference in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-43 (1964), thus extend-
ing the former to commercial banks.
21 Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-324(3), (5) (1966), which states that "out-of-
pocket expenses in connection with making the loan, including the cost of title
examination, title insurance, recording fees, taxes, insurance, . . . appraisals,
credit reports, surveys and attorney's fees" are not to be treated as interest.
" E.g., Real Estate Trustee, Inc. v. Rebhan, 153 Md. 624, 139 A. 351 (1927).
An early North Carolina case, and the only one directly in point, held that where
the lender made a small charge for travel expenses in excess of the legal interest
rate, the transaction was not usurious. Massey, McKesson & Co. v. McDowell, 20
N.C. 252 (1838).
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dollar loan postulated in the preceding paragraph, the effective simple
annual interest rate becomes approximately 13.6 percent.25
Residential Loans
An exception for residential loans26 was created by the 1967 General
Assembly in response to an outcry in the housing market. A maximum of
seven percent per annum. "simple interest on the unpaid principal balance"
agreed upon in writing may be charged on any "direct reduction""' or
"construction"2 loan that is secured by "residential property.' 2  Loans
made within the bounds of this exception are specifically protected from
the penalties of the usury statute.
Ancillary profits received by the lender in addition to the allowable
interest upon such a loan are strictly regulated. A prepayment penalty
of one percent of the outstanding balance may be exacted from the borrower
for prepayment within one year after the first payment on principal. After
that one-year period, no such fee may be collected."0 No lender can reserve
or receive from any "agent, seller, or broker," or from the borrower, any
fees or discounts that, in the aggregate, benefit the lender to an extent
exceeding one percent of the principal.3 A breach of this profit limitation
is apparently intended to constitute a violation of the usury laws, although
the statutes do not explicitly so state.
" Finance charges can be converted into approximate simple annual interest by
this formula:
2pC
r- A (n+1)
r = annual interest
p =number of payment periods in one year exclusive of down payment
C =-interest or finance charges in dollars
A= amount of proceeds received by borrower
n = number of equal installment payments in the whole contract period ex-
clusive of down payment.
Comment, Retail Credit Sales and Usury, 24 LA. L. REv. 822, 840 n.95 (1963). For
a collection of cases on interest computation and usury, see 57 A.L.R.2d 630 (1958).
"oN.C. GuN. STAT. § 24-10 (Supp. 1967).
" A "direct reduction loan" is apparently a loan obtained to finance the purchase
of existing residential property. The statute requires adherence to a schedule of
payments to be made at least quarterly, beginning within ninety days after execu-
tion of the note. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10(1) (Supp. 1967).
" A "construction loan" is to be disbursed as construction progresses and is to
be repaid within eighteen months after the note is executed unless the borrower has
obtained a direct reduction loan. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10(2) (Supp. 1967).
9 "Residential property" is realty on which there is or will be constructed one
or more dwelling units, each of which house not more than four families. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 24-10(a) (Supp. 1967).
oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10 (Supp. 1967).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-11 (Supp. 1967).
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Small Loan Act
The North Carolina Consumer Finance Act32 exempts many small
personal loans from the state's usury laws. Its purpose' is to prevent,
through the licensing and supervision of lenders, sharp practices detri-
mental to impecunious or commercially naive b rrowers. Any person or
organization in the business of lending amounts'of six hundred"'dollars
or less for interest exceeding the legal rate mus be licensed' and must
comply with the regulatory provisions of the act.33 In adlition to criminal
penalties for violations, any loan not in compliance is rehdered void and
the lender has "no right to collect or retain any principaf or' charges what-
soever . . . ."" Loans made by a licensee are limited to six hundred
dollars in amount and twenty-five months in duration. A schedule of
finance charges allows the lender a high return because of the high risk
presumably inherent in most small loans and of administrative costs
that vary little with the size of the loan.3 5 For example, a" charge of fifteen
dollars is allowed for seventy-five dollars in proceeds actually received
by the borrower. Should the principal be repaid in twelve' equal monthly
installments, the simple annual interest rate is approximately thirty-five
percent.
Corporate Exception
Many states do not allow a corporation to raise the defense of usury.3"
Two reasons are normally given for this corporate exception.3 7 The busi-
ness corporation is organized for the concentration of capital and does not
"2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-164 to -191 (1965), as amended (Supp. 1967). This
act is based on the Uniform Small Loan Act, which has been widely adopted among
the states and constitutes a response to the "loan shark" problem. In 1961, there were
593 small loan offices in North Carolina with $116,760,000 in resources. See W.
SIMPsON, AMERICA'S SMALL LOAN PROBLEM 78 (1963); see generally, Simpson,
The Loan Shark Problem in the Southeastern States, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
68 (1954).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-191 (1965) excludes from coverage by the Consumer
Finance Act certain lenders, including auto financers, commercial banks, industrial
banks, and savings and loan associations.
s, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-166 (1965).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-173 (1965). The lender may make no charges b'eyond
those authorized. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-178 (1965).
" E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 125 (1957). "No corporation shall interpose
the defense of usury in any action." North Carolina's statute treats corporations as
natural persons, in the absence of contrary legislation. Commissioners v. Atlantic
& N.C.R.R., 77 N.C. 289 (1877).
The corporate exception was first enacted in New York in response to the
decision in Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Ins. & Trust Co., 3 N.Y. 344 (1850),
which held void a bank's obligation to repay two hundred fifty thousand dollars
loaned to it in a reasonable commercial transaction. Shanks 346.
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need protection against lenders. Furthermore, the corporation is the
"prime vehicle" of commerce and should not be subjected to the restraint
that the usury laws place upon the flow of capital."8 Subscribing to a lim-
ited extent in these theories, the North Carolina legislature has created
partial exemptions for corporate borrowers. These are specifically stated
in General Statutes Chapter 24, Interest. Private corporations are autho-
rized to sell their "coupon bonds" at a discount.3 9 This provision was
enacted in response to a decision 40 holding the discount sale of corporate
bonds bearing the maximum legal interest to be a loan at an illegal effective
rate. Therefore, its application is properly limited to the bona fide public
marketing of corporate bonds paying interest through the coupon device.
Private corporations may also contract with any lender for liabilities to
be discharged by installments bearing a maximum rate of six percent per
annum calculated upon the entire amount of the loan for the duration
of the loan.4' The importance of this authorization, however, is diminished
by those exceptions discussed above that allow commercial banks and cer-
tain other lenders to calculate in this manner interest upon loans to any
borrower.
Another corporate exemption42 allows any lender to charge and any
corporation to pay interest up to eight percent per annum where the agree-
ment calls for thirty thousand dollars or more in a lump sum loan or in
a series of future advances to be repaid in at least that amount. To qualify
for such treatment, the loan must mature at least five years from its in-
ception, and payments must not exceed one-fifth of the principal in any
of the first five years of the loan's term. This statute does not authorize
discounting of interest or calculation of interest upon the whole principal
notwithstanding the payment of installments. An individual guarantor,
endorser, or surety for such a loan is specifically limited in his liability
for interest to six percent per annum.4 3
"s Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332 (1925), quoted
in Comment, Usury Laws and the Corporate Exception, 23- MD. L. REv. 51, 55
(1962).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1965).
40 Commissioners v. Atlantic & N.C.R.R., 77 N.C. 289 (1877).
,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1965).
,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-8 (1965).
'* While the corporate exception has not been litigated in North Carolina, cases
from other jurisdictions indicate that it can bar parties other than corporations
from the usury defense. See Penrose v. Canton Nat'l Bank, 147 Md. 200, 127 A.
852 (1925) ; MacQuoid v. Queens Estates, 143 App. Div. 134, 127 N.Y.S. 867 (1911)(minority shareholders in the borrowing corporation); Houghten v. Restland
Memorial Park, Inc., 343 Pa. 625, 23 A.2d 497 (1942) (the corporation's receiver
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Increasing use of accounts receivable financing has caused the aboli-
tion of interest limitations on loans obtained from commercial factors by
corporations organized for profit.44 These loans must be secured by in-
terests in accounts receivable or certain other tangible or intangible per-
sonal property. This particular provision, while commercially desirable,
is exemplary of the irrational, piecemeal approach taken to interest regu-
lation. There is nothing distinctive about the factoring situation qualifying
it for treatment different from that accorded any business financing
arrangement. Furthermore, there is little that is distinctive about the
corporate borrower in general that should entitle it to borrow at higher
interest rates than can the individual businessman. The corporation may
be a corner grocery store while the individual may own or control assets
totaling millions. Distinctions should be drawn as to the borrower's
bargaining power rather than as to the form of his business organization.
The corporate exception has not been reviewed by any North Caro-
lina court to date. Decisions from other jurisdictions, however, indicate
that there is likely to be controversy over use of the corporate veil solely
to avoid the usury law.4' The question is whether an individual can
legitimately create a corporation with no immediate purpose other than
payment of higher interest rates. There are two divergent views of this
problem. New York courts have held that a corporation is by its nature
a matter of form to be adopted for the purpose of obtaining certain legal
advantages. 46 As an individual may incorporate his assets to obtain
limited liability, so may he incorporate to avoid the usury laws. New
Jersey courts, rejecting this view, have indicated that a case-by-case de-
termination must be made, the crucial factor being the lender's participa-
tion in the incorporation. 4' The New Jersey decisions indicate concern
that the lender may use the corporate exception to take advantage of
consumers48 and small businessmen. North Carolina's courts, if faced with
or trustee in bankruptcy). See Comment, Usury Laws and the Corporate Excep-
tion, 23 MD. L. REV. 51 (1962).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-9 (1965). "Commercial factor" is defined as any
corporation or partnership engaging, in the regular course of its business, in the
non-recourse, notification purchase of accounts receivable.
, See generally Comment, Incorporation to Avoid the Usury Laws, 68 COLUM.
L. REV. 1390 (1968).
"E.g., Werger v. Haines Corp., 302 N.Y. 930, 100 N.E.2d 189 (1951) ; Jenkins
v. Morse, 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930).
'
T E.g., Gelber v. Kugel's Tavern, Inc., 10 N.J. 191, 89 A.2d 654 (1952).
, Indeed, this has been the case in New York, where legislation to prevent use
by lenders of the corporate exception for incorporated private homes has been
necessary. See N;Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 374 (McKinney 1968).
1969]
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the question, will probably follow the latter view; for, where a corporation
serves merely as "a shield for . . . activities in violation of the declared
public policy or statute of the state, the.corporate entity will be dis-
regarded .... ."" The declared public policy of North Carolina's usury
law is to protect the necessitous borrower. Since the corporate exception
is based in theory upon the need for higher interest rates in business
financing, it should not be available in a consumer context. Should a
corporation be formed to carry on a bona fide business, the corporate entity
will probably be respected by the courts although its prime immediate
purpose be to obtain credit at rates above six percent per annum. Where,
however, the corporation serves only as a subterfuge for evasion of the
usury laws, North Carolina courts will undoubtedly look upon the indi-
vidual behind the corporation as the true borrower.
Other Exceptions
The statutory rate of interest for loans made by co-operative credit
unions is one percent per month, which may be computed upon the whole
principal for the entire term of an installment loan and deducted in ad-
vance."0 Except for a membership fee, the credit union can receive no
other consideration for the loan. The effective simple annual interest rate
for such a loan payable in installments is approximately 25.1 percent.
Exemption for co-operatives is presumably allowed because borrower-
members will be vigilant in controlling interest rates.
Another co-operative organization, the agricultural credit corporation,
can charge for agricultural loans up to eight percent per annum or three
percent per annum in excess of the rediscount rate charged it by federal
intermediate credit banks.5 ' This exception is also applicable to the
Production Credit Associations, which account for a large partu2 of total
farm credit. Since P.C.A. loans normally bear lower rates than the
market generally for similarly situated borrowers, they have the effect of
driving down the cost of agricultural loans generally. In 1967-68 the
P.C.A.'s were charging seven to eight percent per annum. If a government-
sponsored farmer co-operative must charge such rates, surely a six per-
cent rate limit is unrealistic for the credit market as a whole.
Loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration or the Veterans
"Henderson v. Security Mortgage & Fin. Co., 273 N.C. 253, 260, 160 S.E.2d
39, 44 (1968).
".NC. GEN. STAT. § 54-88 (1965).1 N.C.-GEN. STAT. § 54-89 (1965).
2 For a discussion of .usury and farm credit, see Benfield 865.
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Administration, but made by private lenders, are wholly removed from
statutory interest regulation.0 FHA and VA lenders are closely super-
vised by their insuring federal agencies, thus minimizing the possibility
of improper interest practices. This exception was enacted in 1935 at
the behest of the Federal Housing Administration to insure uniform treat-
ment of FHA loans."4
National Banks
Under federal statute,5 a national bank can charge interest at the
rates allowed by the jurisdiction 0 wherein it is located or at a rate of
one percent per annum in excess of the discount rate charged by its par-
ticular branch of the federal reserve bank on ninety-day commercial paper.
The legal remedies allowed for a usurious transaction are the same as
those under the North Carolina usury statute, which is patterned after
the federal act.
57
Criminal Sanctions
The only criminal penalty exclusively for a usury violation is imposed
for reserving more than six percent interest upon a loan secured by house-
hold or kitchen furniture or by an assignment of wages. 8 The statute has
been revised recently in order to bring conditional sales within its purview.
This apparently creates a small inroad into the "time price" doctrine dis-
cussed below. It may, therefore, prove an effective deterrent against
unconscionable credit sale schemes aimed at the poor. Any deterrent
value depends upon its use by legal aid agencies and others engaged in
the practice of poverty law. Although the law was initially enacted in
1907, there is only one reported case dealing with its provisions.59
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-45(e) (1965).
See Poyner, Some Practical Aspects of the North Carolina Law of Usury,
12 N.C. BAR NoTEs 3, 7 (1960).
12 U.S.C. § 85 (1964).
As to the application of state usury law to national banks, see generally Annot.,
101 A.L.R. 750 (1936). Since national banks are created by federal law to facili-
tate interstate commerce, state law cannot interfere with their operations by settting
interest rates. Maximum rates for national banks can be set only by federal statute.
Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29 (1875) ; Oldham v. First
Nat'l Bank, 85 N.C. 240 (1881).
Compare 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1964) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1965).
M N.C, GEN. STAT. § 14-391 (1965). A violation is a misdemeanor. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 53-166 (1965) imposes criminal penalties for any violation of the Consumer
Finance Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § .53-164 (1965) exempts lenders licensed under
the Consumer Finance Act from N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-391 (1965) penalties.
"' State v. Davis, 157 N.C. 648, 73 S.E. 130 (1911).
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THE FOUR COMMANDMENTS
"The words of the [usury] statutes are general and the decisions of
the courts are largely based not on interpretation of specific words but
on doctrines developed by the courts in regard to usury which form in a
sense a kind of common law in regard to the subject . . . ."60 This "com-
mon law," which has developed around a purely statutory"' creature, estab-
lishes four widely accepted "constituents of usury" :12
(1) A loan or forbearance of money; (2) an understanding that the
money loaned shall be returned; (3) payment or agreement to pay a
greater rate of interest than that allowed by law; and (4) a corrupt
intent to take more than the legal rate for the use of the money.03
In order to establish the usurious nature of a transaction, the borrower
must affirmatively plead64 and prove5 each"0 of these elements. He must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that, in substance, the trans-
action was a loan for which the lender intentionally exacted illegal in-
terest.0 Parol evidence is admissible to show the true nature of the deal-
0 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 526, Introductory Note (1932).
" Virginia Trust Co. v. Lambeth Realty Corp., 215 N.C. 526, 2 S.E.2d 544
(1939).
62 These four elements were formulated by treatise writers and have been widely
adopted by the courts. E.g., J. WEBB, TitE LAW OF USURY § 18 (1899).
"Henderson v. Security Mortgage & Fin. Co., 273 N.C. 253, 263, 160 S.E.2d
39, 47 (1968). See, e.g., Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 132
S.E.2d 692 (1963); Preyer v. Parker, 257 N.C. 440, 125 S.E.2d 916 (1962);
Miller v. Dunn, 188 N.C. 397, 124 S.E. 746 (1924); Ector v. Osborne, 179 N.C.
667, 103 S.E. 388 (1920); Planters Nat'l Bank v. Wysong & Miles Co., 177 N.C.
380, 99 S.E. 199 (1919); Swamp Loan & Trust Co. v. Yokley, 174 N.C. 573, 94
S.E. 102 (1917); Monk v. Goldstein, 172 N.C. 516, 90 S.E. 519 (1916).
" Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Hanner, 268 N.C. 668, 151 S.E.2d 579 (1966) (plead-
ings failed to allege a loan); Dixon v. Osborne, 204 N.C. 480, 168 S.E. 683 (1933) ;
Berger v. Stevens, 197 N.C. 234, 148 S.E. 244 (1929) (usury may not be raised
by demurrer, but must be affirmatively pleaded); Rountree v. Brinson, 98 N.C. 107,
3 S.E. 747 (1887).
0" "[T]he burden of proof is on the party claiming [the transaction] to be
usury . . . ." Monk v. Goldstein, 172 N.C. 516, 518, 90 S.E. 519, 521 (1916).
See also Perry v. Doub, 249 N.C. 322, 106 S.E.2d 582 (1959) (plaintiff failed to
carry the burden of proof).
"0 "[U]nless these four things concur in every transaction it is safe to say that
no case of usury can be declared." Doster v. English, 152 N.C. 339, 341, 67 S.E.
754, 756 (1910).
"A profit, greater than the lawful rate of interest, intentionally exacted as a
bonus for the loan of money, imposed upon the necessities of the borrower in
a transaction where the treaty is for a loan and the money is to be returned
in all events, is a violation of the usury laws, it matters not what form or
disguise it may assume.
Id. at 341, 67 S.E. at 756.
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ings, even though the written indicia of debt recite interest at a legal rate.6 8
Where there is no material dispute as to the facts, the court may declare
a transaction usurious as a matter of law.69 Otherwise, the existence of
usury is determined by the jury."0 If the first three elements are apparent
upon the face of the contract, corrupt intent will be implied ;71 if not, the
party asserting usury must introduce evidence to establish the lender's
state of mind.72 The necessary intent is found "in the charging or receiving
the excessive interest with the knowledge that it is prohibited by law, and
the purpose to violate it."73 The subjective nature of an intent determina-
tion demands that reasonable inferences be drawn from more objective
facts. Thus, as a practical matter, it is not difficult to establish intent74
in a civil action involving usury where the loan and the illegal interest
are clearly proved.
If the elements of a usurious transaction are present, the borrower
has two possible legal remedies.7 5 Where the borrower has in fact paid
money or its equivalent as usurious interest,76 he can recover as a penalty
" Ridley v. Jim Walter Corp., 272 N.C. 673, 158 S.E.2d 869 (1968).
" Doster v. English, 152 N.C. 339, 67 S.E. 754 (1910).
"0 Henderson v. Security Mortgage & Fin. Co., 273 N.C. 253, 160 S.E.2d 39
(1968) ; Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d 692 (1963) ;
Monk v. Goldstein, 172 N.C. 516, 90 S.E. 519 (1916). For decisions as to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, see Henderson v. Security
Mortgage & Fin. Co., 273 N.C. 253,, 160 S.E.2d 39 (1968); White v. Disher, 232
N.C. 260, 59 S.E.2d 798 (1950).
"1 Planters Nat'l Bank v. Wysong & Miles Co., 177 N.C. 380, 99 S.E 199 (1919);
MacRackan v. Bank of Columbus, 164 N.C. 24, 80 S.E. 184 (1913) ; Charles S. Riley
& Co. v. W.T. Sears & Co., 154 N.C. 509, 70 S.E. 997 (1911).
2 For a case where parol evidence in the form of testimony by the parties and
their attorneys was allowed to show their intentions, see Doster v. English, 152
N.C. 339, 67 S.E. 754 (1910). See also Perry v. Doub, 249 N.C. 322, 106 S.E.2d
582 (1959) (plaintiff failed to prove intent).
"' MacRackan v. Bank of Columbus, 164 N.C. 24, 26, 80 S.E. 184, 185 (1913).
See Ector v. Osborne, 179 N.C. 667, 103 S.E. 388 (1920); Bennett v. Best, 142
N.C. 168, 55 S.E. 84 (1906) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1964) requires that usurious
interest be "knowingly" exacted. But cf. Ehringhaus v. Ford, 25 N.C. 522 (1843)
(construing ante-bellum statute and holding no intent to violate law necessary).
The intent requirement also is important in determining whether a purportedly
exempt transaction is in fact a subterfuge for evasion of usury laws. See discussion
of avoidance and evasion, infra.
' In a usury action, intent is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
Yarbrough v. Hughes, 139 N.C. 199, 208, 51 S.E. 904, 907 (1905).
7 The rights granted by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1965) may be asserted by the
borrower even though he importuned the lender to lend to him at illicit rates and
is considered in pari delicto with the lender. MacRackan v. Bank of Columbus,
164 N.C. 24, 80 S.E. 184 (1913).
70 Rushing v. Bivens, 132 N.C. 273-, 43 S.E. 798 (1903). Merely giving or
renewing a note for interest does not constitute payment. Ragan v. Stephens, 178
N.C. 101, 100 S.E. 196 (1919).
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an amount equal to twice the entire interest paid by him.77 In any event,
because the usury violation works a complete forfeiture7 of all the in-
terest charged, the borrower can successfully defend any action brought
by the lender to collect the interest. These remedies are wholly distinct
and must be separately asserted.7 ' The penalty may be obtained in an
action by the borrower in the nature of an action for debt, or it may be
recovered on a counterclaim 0 in the lender's action to collect principal or
interest. The terms of the statute limit the recovery that may be had
and constitute the exclusive legal remedy for a usurious transaction.,,
An action for the penalty is barred by the statute of limitations upon the
lapse of two years from the date of payment.8 2 No statute of limitations
runs against the forfeiture defense, which may be asserted whenever the
lender brings an action for the interest.m
The borrower also has an equitable remedy84 under certain circum-
stances. Where the lender holds a security interest in real or personal
property as a result of usurious dealings, the debtor or other person with
an interest8 5 in the security property can obtain affirmative equitable relief
Tayloe v. Parker, 137 N.C. 418, 49 S.E. 921 (1905).
When usury is charged, the debt becomes simply a loan bearing no interest,
and the debtor is entitled to have all his payments credited to principal. Ervin v.
First Nat'l Bank, 161 N.C. 42, 76 S.E. 529 (1912). See also, as to the nature of the
statutory remedies, Guaranty Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Fair Promise A.M.E. Zion
Church, 219 N.C. 395, 14 S.E.2d 37 (1941); Ripple v. Mortgage & Accept. Corp.,
193 N.C. 422, 137 S.E. 156 (1927).
"' Where the penalty is sought, the time and amount of payment must be alleged
with specificity if the information is known or obtainable. Charles S. Riley & Co.
v. W.T. Sears & Co., 154 N.C. 509, 70 S.E. 997 (1911).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1965). This counterclaim is properly brought only
in an action for debt commenced by the lender and based upon the usurious trans-
action or some other transaction between the parties. Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Robeson Motors, 243 N.C. 326, 90 S.E.2d 886 (1956). It may not be brought in
a tort action, Commercial Fin. Co. v. Holder, 235 N.C. 96, 68 S.E.2d 794 (1952),
or an ejectment action, North Carolina Mortgage Corp. v. Wilson, 205 N.C. 493,
171 S.E. 783 (1933).
"'Auto Fin. Co. v. Simmons, 247 N.C. 724, 102 S.E.2d 119 (1958) (borrower
unsuccessfully alleged the same facts for usury and fraud causes of action).
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-53 (1953'). The cause of action for the penalty accrues
upon the date of payment. The statute does not run during a period of non-residence
by the lender or his agent. Ghormley v. Hyatt, 208 N.C. 478, 181 S.E. 242 (1935) ;
Farmer's Bank & Trust Co. v. Redwine, 204 N.C. 125, 167 S.E. 687 (1933); Cuth-
bertson v. Peoples Bank, 170 N.C. 531, 87 S.E. 333 (1915).Pugh v. Scarboro, 200 N.C. 59, 156 S.E. 149 (1930).
84 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1965).
A junior mortgage has been held to have sufficient interest. Pinnix v. Mary-
land Cas. Co., 214 N.C. 760, 200 S.E. 874 (1939). Presumably, under the language
of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1965), any recognized property interest would be
sufficient.
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to prevent foreclosure until final determination of the parties' liabilities.
Prior to statutory recognition 6 of the remedy, the debtor was required
to "do equity" by tendering the principal plus interest at the legal rate
to the lender before he could seek equitable relief."' When he did obtain
equitable relief he also denied himself any remedy under the usury statute.88
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1964) has been amended to change these rules
by explicitly negating the tender requirement, which had denied equitable
relief to the impecunious borrower, and by explicitly entitling the bor-
rower to both equitable and statutory remedies.
Remedies available under the usury statute are personal to the bor-
rower89 and his legal representatives." Since these remedies were en-
acted for the benefit of the borrower, he can waive the right to rely on
them under certain narrowly defined circumstances. Where a controversy
has arisen about a usurious contract and the debtor has entered into a
compromise or a general settlement as to the transaction, his recognition
of an obligation under the settlement will preclude his setting up the old
transaction in defense of the new debt. The settlement must have been
arrived at fairly and without circumstances of imposition. It must con-
stitute a just debt in the nature of a novation rather than a mere renewal
of the prior debt.91 Under no other circumstances can a borrower waive
his rights under the statute. Neither the borrower's prior consent to
usury nor his subsequent approval of it constitutes waiver.92
" Ch. 110 [1959] N.C. Sess. L.
8 "Where a debtor seeks the aid of a court of equity on the ground his debt is
tainted with usury, he may have the usurious element.., eliminated from his debt
only upon his paying the principal of his debt with interest at the legal rate. [Hie
is not entitled to the benefit of the statutory penalties for usury." Bailey v. Inman,
224 N.C. 571, 573-74, 31 S.E.2d 769, 770 (1944). See, e.g., Pinnix v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 214 N.C. 760, 200 S.E. 874 (1939) ; Buchanan v. Carolina Mortgage Co.,
213 N.C. 247, 195 S.E. 787 (1938); Miller v. Dunn, 188 N.C. 397, 124 S.E. 746
(1924). But cf. Churchill v. Turnage, 122 N.C. 426, 30 S.E. 122, 123 (1898)
(Clark, J., dissenting). Judge Clark argued that the tender requirement had
validity only during the period when the harsh statutory remedy was forfeiture
of the principal, and that it should be abandoned under the newer statute.88 Waters v. Garris, 188 N.C. 305, 124 S.E. 334 (1924).88E.g., Virginia Trust Co. v. Lambeth Realty Corp., 215 N.C. 526, 2 S.E.2d 544
(1939).
" "Legal representative" includes trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, and executor.
Ripple v. Mortgage & Accept. Corp., 193 N.C. 422, 137 S.E. 156 (1927); Charles
S. Riley & Co. v. W.T. Sears & Co., 154 N.C. 509, 70 S.E. 997 (1911).
"
1Hill v. Lindsay, 210 N.C. 694, 188 S.E. 406 (1936). See Ghormley v. Hyatt,
208 N.C. 478, 181 S.E. 242 (1935); Dixon v. Osborne, 204 N.C. 480, 168 S.E. 683
(1933) ; Miller v. Dunn, 188 N.C. 397, 124 S.E. 746 (1924) ; Ector v. Osborne, 179
N.C. 667, 103 S.E. 388 (1920).
"2 MacRackan v. Bank of Columbus, 164 N.C. 24, 80 S.E. 184 (1913). Where
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Forfeiture of all interest under the usury statute renders an agreement
as to interest null and void ab initio. Therefore, usury is a real defense"'
against a holder in due course94 to the extent that an instrument represents
interest on a usurious transaction." This rule is intended to preserve the
integrity of the usury prohibition where the lender seeks to evade for-
feiture by negotiating an obligation to an innocent purchaser. It should
be noted that the holder has recourse to the indorsers of the instrument
for breach of their contractual obligations."'
Is IT USURY?
Where a transaction is in reality a loan of money, whatever may be
its form, and the lender charges for the use of his money a sum in
excess of interest at the legal rate, by whatever name the charge may
be called, the transaction will be held to be usurious. The law con-
siders the substance and not the mere form or outward appearance of
the transaction in order to determine what it in reality is. If this were
not so, the usury laws of the State would easily be evaded by lenders
of money who would exact from borrowers with impunity compensation
for money loaned in excess of interest at the legal rate.07
The tone of this classic admonition by the North Carolina Supreme
Court indicates that the lender who structures a transaction with the
purpose of avoiding the usury laws has perforce failed at the outset.98
By no means is this always the case. The court, faced with the verity
that credit will not be available at legal rates when legal rates are not
the debtor executed a new note and a release that purported to bar its usury claims,
there was no effective waiver because the debtor was forced to pay part of the
usury to obtain further financing. Guaranty Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Fair Promise
A.M.E. Zion Church, 219 N.C. 395, 14 S.E.2d 37 (1941).
" For the effect of a real defense, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-305 (1965).
" A holder in due course takes the instrument for value, in good faith, and with-
out notice of any defense against it. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-302 (1965).
" Federal Reserve Bank v. Jones, 205 N.C. 648, 172 S.E. 185 (1934); Faison v.
Grandy & Sons, 126 N.C. 827, 36 S.E. 276 (1900) ; Ward v. Sugg, 113 N.C. 489,
18 S.E. 717 (1893). See also Auto Fin. Co. v. Simmons, 247 N.C. 724, 102 S.E.2d
119 (1958).
90N.C. GENr. STAT. § 25-3-414 (1965).
Ripple v. Mortgage & Accept. Corp., 193 N.C. 422, 137 S.E. 156 (1927). See,
e.g., Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d 692 (1963);
Pratt v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 196 N.C. 294, 145 S.E. 396 (1928);
English Lumber Co. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 179 N.C. 211, 102 S.E. 205
(1920); Monk v. Goldstein, 172 N.C. 516, 90 S.E. 519 (1916); Charles S. Riley
& Co. v. W. T. Sears & Co., 154 N.C. 509, 70 S.E. 997 (1911).
" A credit transaction will be adjudged usurious "according to its substance and
its necessary tendency and effect, when the purpose and intent of the lender are
unmistakable." Planters Nat'l Bank v. Wysong & Miles Co., 177 N.C. 380, 388,
99 S.E. 199, 204 (1919).
[Vol. 47
USURY LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA
profitable, has created within the credit market various sanctuaries from
the usury laws. It has defined these sanctuaries by deciding that a given
transaction is not in reality a loan of money or that a given payment is
not in reality interest. 9 However, not all avoidance devices proffered by
the parties to credit dealings have been successful. A survey of the cases
will demonstrate that there exist no simple, infallible abstractions that,
when applied to a contract, will indicate whether any part of it will be
subjected to the usury laws. Rather, it is necessary to look to the treat-
ment received in the past by that particular species of contract.0 0
The Time Price Doctrine
A sale on credit is not a loan of money and is therefore not governed
by the usury statutes.' A seller, because he is free to ask any price for
his goods, may set a cash price and an alternative, higher time price. If
the buyer elects the latter, the added amount paid for the seller's for-
bearance is not interest, but merely a price increment. This "time
price"' 02 doctrine draws a wholly artificial distinction between the credit
sale and the loan, both of which have the same economic effect. There is
no real difference between borrowing one hundred dollars at approximately
forty percent simple annual interest to purchase an item and purchasing
" In Associated Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Loan & Inv. Co., 202 F. Supp. 251
(E.D.N.C. 1962) (Craven, J.), the North Carolina usury law was held applicable
to the facts before the court: "The shorthand way of expressing this conclusion is
to call it a loan transaction. . . ." Id. at 253 (emphasis added). For an example
of the North Carolina Supreme Court's deft avoidance of a usury problem, see
Preyer v. Parker, 257 N.C. 440, 125 S.E.2d 916 (1962). In a timberland sale
transaction, the defendant had executed a contract saying "[flor the use of the
thirty-five thousand dollars received from you I will repay thirty-five thousand
dollars plus seventeen thousand five hundred dollars at the time of sale of this
timber." The court held that there was no loan, but that the plaintiffs had paid
thirty-five thousand dollars for an option to purchase land with seventeen thousand
five hundred dollars to serve as liquidated damages if the defendant failed to honor
the option. Neither party had argued the option theory. The transaction was purely
business and potentially involved 1.6 million dollars; therefore, as a matter of policy,
the result was correct.
0 For discussions as to the common means of avoidance and evasion of the
usury laws, see generally Shanks, supra note 5; Prather, Mortgage Loans and the
Usury Laws, 16 Bus. LAW. 181 (1960); Collins, Evasion and Avoidance of
Usury Laws, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 54 (1941).
101 The time price doctrine was established in Beete v. Bidgood, 108 Eng. Rep.
792 (K.B. 1891), and first appeared in the United States in Mitchell v. Griffith, 22
Mo. 515 (1856). See generally Comment, Retail Credit Sales and Usury, 24 LA. L.
REV. 822 (1964).
10' See generally Note, Judicial and Legislative Treatment of "Usurious" Credit
Sales, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1143 (1958).
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the same item for one hundred twenty dollars payable in twelve "easy
monthly payments." Purportedly, the "purchaser is not, like the needy
borrower, a victim of a rapacious lender, since he can refrain from the
purchase." 103 It would seem that borrowers and purchasers are in fact
equally capable of self-restraint.
Recent cases10 4 have demonstrated that the "time price" axiom has
much vitality in North Carolina where all "bona fide" credit sales are
exempted from any supervision of finance charges.', 5 A "sale" does not
become a "loan" even though the financer to whom the buyer's note is
negotiated has solicited business from the seller, furnished all the forms
used, and provided a set of tables to be used in computing the "time
price differential." Nor does the use of a percentage formula to calculate
the differential affect its de jure nature. The discounting of commercial
paper to a financer is in itself a sale and thus not subject to the usury
laws.100 But Ripple v. Mortgage & Acceptance Corp.'07 indicates that
there may be limits to the court's indulgence in allowing credit sales
financing without regulation. Where the purchase of a 1924 automobile
resulted in over eleven hundred dollars in finance charges and the sale
contract named the financer as vendor, the transaction was held to be
a colorable attempt to evade the usury laws and thus subject to them.
More recent cases distinguish Ripple because its holding was based on
the contradiction between the contract and the facts regarding the initial
locus of title to the automobile. Automobile financers have since scrupu-
103 Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 340, 132 S.E.2d 692, 695
(1963).
14 Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Hanner, 268 N.C. 668, 151 S.E.2d 579 (1966),
noted in 45 N.C.L. REV. 1151 (1967); Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon, 260
N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d 692 (1963).
"'See, e.g., Dillingham v. Gardner, 222 N.C. 279, 21 S.E.2d 898 (1942);
Hendrix v. Harry's Cadillac Co., 220 N.C. 84, 16 S.E.2d 456 (1941); Doster v.
English, 152 N.C. 339, 67 S.E. 754 (1910); Yarborough v. Hughes, 139 N.C. 199,
51 S.E. 904 (1905). North Carolina has no comprehensive retail sales legislation
such as Maryland's Retail Installment Sales Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 128
(1957) et seq., which sets limits for finance charges and requires full disclosure
of credit terms. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-54 (1966), limits the time price differential
for the credit sale of certain agricultural supplies to ten percent per annum.
100 Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d 692 (1963).
This practice is prevalent in automobile sales where the bank all but sets up a branch
on the dealer's premises and total finance charges reach thirty percent per annum.
Charlotte (N.C.), Observer, Mar. 5, 1969, § A at 1, col. 1.
1 193 N.C. 423, 137 S.E. 156 (1927). See Monk v. Goldstein, 172 N.C. 516, 90
S.E. 519 (1916) (usury found where "buyer" first approached the financer for a
loan whereupon financer purchased the automobile and "sold" it to buyer for a
high time price).
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lously avoided this pitfall. The cases continue to state, nevertheless, that
substance controls form in determining the nature of credit dealings,
thereby leaving open the possibility that the usury statutes will be applied
to time price sales that exhibit too many loan characteristics." 8
The ruling that a time price differential computed by taking a per-
centage of the cash price does not constitute interest indicates that the same
result may obtain as to a "revolving charge plan." Under such a plan,109
the merchant allows his customer to purchaser items on credit with the
cash price of each to be debited to the customer's account. Rather than
setting a "time price" for each item, the merchant exacts a 1.5 percent
per month "service charge" computed upon any balance outstanding longer
than thirty days. Such charges for forbearance of debt are substantially
similar to the time price differential, both of which are arrived at by the
use of a formula in which the variables are time and the percentage to
be charged. In this context, however, credit is directly extended by the
vendor rather than by a purchaser of commercial paper, which gives the
revolving charge plan a bit more the appearance of a loan than does
the tripartite transaction.
Akin to the revolving charge plan is the bank credit card," 0 which
also entails a 1.5 percent per month service charge on any balance out-
standing more than thirty days. The bank and the cardholder maintain
a continuing relationship, as do the bank and participating merchants.
When a cardholder purchases an item with his card, he signs a negotiable
"sales draft" in which he, as "purchaser-acceptor," agrees to pay to the
bank "or order" the amount indicated thereon. This draft is discounted
to the bank which debits its amount to the cardholder's account. The tri-
partite nature of this arrangement renders it closely analogous to the
financing situation discussed above in which commercial paper is negotiated
to the financer. Thus, the retail sale financing aspect of the bank credit
' Cf. Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973
(1952), holding that where the vendor reserves a time price differential with the
intention and assurance of transferring the commercial paper to a financer, the
usury laws apply. Arkansas has not abandoned its time price doctrine, but has de-
termined that such transactions are subterfuges for usury.
... North Carolina has no decisions as to revolving charge plans. Arkansas and
Nebraska courts have held that where a percentage rate is applied to a cash price,
the differential is paid for forbearance of a debt and is thus limited by the usury
laws. Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 664, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1958) ; Lloyd
v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963).
..0 For an interesting discussion by a banker of the ethical problems involved in
high finance charges in automobile financing and bank credit cards, see Raleigh
(N.C.) News and Observer, Feb. 9, 1969, § IV, at 3, col. 5.
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card is probably exempt from North Carolina's usury laws. The opposite
is true of loans available to the cardholder, which are euphemistically
labelled, for example, "instant money." A cardholder presents his card
at the bank whereupon he receives the amount of "instant money" re-
quested less a five percent fee. The full amount of the loan is then debited
to his account and treated as would be the amount of a purchase made
with the card. Should a cardholder seek a two hundred dollar loan, receive
one hundred ninety dollars in proceeds, and repay two hundred dollars
in twelve equal monthly installments, the effective simple annual interest
rate would be approximately 27.2 percent. Such a two party transaction,
involving no sale of merchandise, palpably constitutes a loan of money
under the usury laws. "Where there is a negotiation for a loan of money,
and the borrower agrees to return the amount advanced at all events, it
is a contract of lending, and, however the transaction may be shaped or
disguised, if a profit or return beyond the legal rate of interest is in-
tended ... the contract is usurious.""'
The Colorable Sale
Because sales are not governed by the usury statutes, a ploy common-
ly used to evade interest limitation is the sale and repurchase."' A build-
ing contractor in need of financing might sell equipment to a lender for
ten thousand dollars with an option to repurchase the equipment in one year
for its then fair market value of thirteen thousand dollars. Possession and
enjoyment of the equipment remain in the contractor. In economic effect,
this "sale" allows the lender a thirty percent per annum return for use
of his money as well as a security interest in the equipment. Where funds
were borrowed from a corporation and at the closing of the loan such a
sale with option to repurchase was made to the corporation's president,
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the usury defense was not
available against the corporation because the borrower had failed to prove
the sale a quid pro quo for the loan. Nevertheless, the court considered
the evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that the "sale" was a usurious
subterfuge and stated that the usury defense would be available in an
action by the president for possession of the equipment "sold.""' 3
.. MacRackan v. Bank of Columbus, 164 N.C. 24, 26, 80 S.E. 184, 185 (1913).
"- Collins, Evasion, and Avoidance of Usury Laws, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD.
54, 64 (1941).
11 Sledge Lumber Corp. v. Southern Builders Equip. Co., 257 N.C. 435, 126
S.E.2d 97 (1962). "The profit realized [on a sale] even if excessive, would not
amount to usury, unless it was a mere device to cover and conceal a usurious trans-
action." Yarbrough v. Hughes, 139 N.C. 199, 207, 51 S.E. 904, 907 (1905). For
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Another nominal sale subject to the usury laws is the sale with full
recourse. Evidences of debt are normally the items transferred in such
a transaction. The "seller" in a recourse sale guarantees that the buyer
will, in all events, recoup all the money advanced plus the amount of the
discount on the sale." 4 If the guaranteed profit exceeds the legal inter-
est rate, the buyer is guilty of usury. It matters not whether the seller
actually has to pay under his recourse obligations so long as the buyer
receives a profit in excess of the legal interest rate, for the courts do not
distinguish direct payments from indirect profits in this context. 5
An increasingly popular device that serves the economic purpose of
a loan is the "sale and leaseback."" Property is sold to a leasing corpora-
tion or financer, which then leases it back to the seller at a rental charge
calculated to bear a profitable return for the lessor. The lessee gets income
tax deductions for rent paid rather than much smaller interest or deprecia-
tion deductions and, if the property is equipment, he may receive main-
tenance service from the lessor. At the end of the lease term, the lessee
makes a "balloon" payment in return for full title to the property. As
does a secured loan, the sale and leaseback furnishes liquid capital while
the initial owner of the property retains its use."' Although this scheme
may have business purposes other than evasion of the usury laws, the
latter purpose normally plays the larger role. In light of the existing case
law concerning colorable sales, the North Carolina courts would probably
hold the sale and leaseback to be in fact a loan.""
The Hazard Agreement
Since one necessary element of a usurious transaction is a fixed obli-
gation to repay the borrowed funds, the terms of a loan contract sometimes
decisions holding certain transactions which smack of credit dealings to be purely
sales, see Dillingham v. Gardner, 222 N.C. 79, 21 S.E 2d 898 (1942) (sale of a
promissory note); Doster v. English, 152 N.C. 339, 67 S.E. 754 (1910) (defendant
bought in land for plaintiff at a foreclosure sale and resold it to him at a higher
price).
"' Associated Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Loan & Inv. Corp., 202 F. Supp. 251
(E.D.N.C. 1962); Sedbury v. Duffy, 158 N.C. 432, 74 S.E. 3 (1912); Ballinger
v. Edwards, 39 N.C. 449 (1846).
"' Associated Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Loan & Inv. Corp., 202 F. Supp. 251
(E.D.N.C. 1962).
" See Shanks 340-41.
117 For a decision as to whether a lease creates a security interest for filing pur-
poses under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, see li re Transcontinental
Indus., Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
118 For the decisions from other jurisdictions about colorable sales, see cases col-
lected in Annot., 154 A.L.R. 1063 (1945).
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specify that it need not be repaid if a certain contingency occurs. Such a
device can be successful because of the notion that any payment in excess
of the legal interest rate is compensation for the "hazard" that the principal
will be lost." 9 The hazard, however, must be a material one. For example,
where a lender assumes the full risks of a business venture as to the
principal and receives no guarantee that it will otherwise be repaid, a
share of the profits is not usurious though the return exceeds licit in-
terest rates. If the contingency be merely nominal, with no real hazard
to the principal, 120 as where repayment is predicated on the existence of
a certain parcel of land at the date due, the usury laws apply.
Discounting and Add-on Interest
As noted in the discussion of North Carolina statutes above, the "dis-
counting," or deducting, of maximum legal interest in advance is allowed
only for certain lenders. For example, the borrower executes a note for two
hundred dollars and receives one hundred ninety dollars although he asled
to borrow two hundred dollars. This practice is also known as charging
"add-on" interest: the borrower asks for and receives two hundred dollars,
but he executes a note for two hundred ten dollars. The common law rule
is that the discounted note is usurious if the effective rate, computed upon
the proceeds actually received, is excessive, regardless of the stated rate
of interest. 21 Nevertheless, "interest by way of discount may be taken in
advance for short periods" up to one year in length even though the
maximum legal interest be deducted.' 22
Chattel paper is an article of commerce that can be sold; therefore, its
sale at a discount is not subject to the North Carolina usury laws. Such
discounting must, of course, be a "true" sale and not part of a subterfuge
to evade interest limitations' 23
Bona Fide Error and the De Minimus Doctrine
A slight error by the lender, in calculation or otherwise, that causes the
interest reserved or paid to exceed the allowable rate is not generally
viewed as sufficient to invoke usury penalties. One reason is that a very
small error does not evidence intent to take usury; another is that the
119 Collins, Evasion and Avoidance of Usury Laws, 8 LAW & CONTE M1P. PRon.
54, 62 (1941).
11' Charles S. Riley & Co. v. W.T. Sears & Co., 154 N.C. 509, 70 S.E. 997
(1911).
11 Shanks 337. There are no North Carolina cases directly in point.
"'Crowell v. Jones, 167 N.C. 386, 388, 83 S.E. 551, 552 (1914).1
.' See cases cited note 106 supra.
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courts are loath to hear insignificant controversies. 2 4 A North Carolina
decision held an allegation of payment received by mistake to be insufficient
to raise the usury issue. 2 5 Furthermore, the taking or exacting of ex-
cessive interest must be done intentionally and "not by mere error of calcu-
lation.' 2 0 Considering the rule that corrupt intent can be implied as a
matter of law where usury appears on the face of the contract, 2 7 a usurious
increment that is more than slight would not be a "bona fide" error. It
would, therefore, be violative of the usury statute.
Fees and Other Financing Charges
Fees charged the borrower as reimbursement for expenses actually
incurred and services actually rendered by the lender incidental to making
the loan are not generally held to be interest. These fees must not be
excessive, nor may they be charged with intent to evade interest limitations.
They must be bona fide charges that are reasonable in relation to the
amount of the loan12 8 and to the nature of the collateral. Fees that are
clearly unreasonable will probably give rise to an implication as a matter
of law that usury was intended.. 29 Examination of title to and appraisal
of collateral cause most of the costs properly chargeable to the borrower.
The borrower may also be charged for drafting and recording documents
necessary for closing the loan.'8 Ordinary overhead expenses incurred
by the lender in the course of its business cannot be passed along to the
borrower.' 3 '
There is little North Carolina authority regarding such fees. An early
case held that a small charge in excess of the legal interest rate for the
lender's travel expenses did not taint the transaction with usury.' 2 In
1895, the court held that an undertaking by the borrower to pay the
lender's attorney's fee resulting from default or foreclosure rendered the
contract usurious. By way of dictum, the court added that this holding did
not require the lender to bear all costs incident to the loan or foreclosure. 33
... Prather, Mortgage Loans and the Usury Laws, 16 Bus. LAw. 181, 196
(1960).
112' Gillam v. Life Ins. Co., 121 N.C. 369, 28 S.E. 470 (1897).
'- Ward v. Sugg, 113 N.C. 489, 494, 18 S.E. 717, 720 (1893).
'* See cases cited note 71 supra.
". See cases collected in Annot., 105 A.L.R. 795 (1936); Annot., 63 A.L.R.
823 (1929); Annot., 21 A.L.R. 797 (1922); see Note, 10 N.C.L. REv. 403 (1932).
12' See cases cited note 71 supra.
,oAnnot., 21 A.L.R. 797, 871-75 (1922).
I
1 1d.
, Massey, McKesson & Co. v. McDowell, 20 N.C. 252 (1838).
" Williams v. Rich, 117 N.C. 235, 23 S.E. 257 (1895).
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Disallowance of the attorney's fee should not be taken as indicative of the
court's attitude toward bona fide fees in general.18 4 Although partially
founded upon the usury concept, it largely results from a legal antipathy
toward any penalty levied against the debtor upon default.8 6
The North Carolina court has implicitly recognized the validity of
reasonable incidental expenses chargeable to the borrower. It character-
ized use of the contract term "items of expense," without more specificity,
to describe charges in excess of the licit rate as "strongly indicative of
usurious evasion." Determination of whether these fees were in fact
usurious was left to the jury,"8 6 which could presumably find them to be
legitimate non-interest payments.
Where the lender exacts charges that are not in fact reimbursement for
expense incurred or services rendered, North Carolina's usury statute has
been held to apply.137 "[A]ny charges made against [the borrower] in
excess of the lawful rate of interest, whether called fines, charges, dues or
interest are, in fact, interest and usurious."'"" Attempts to evade the usury
laws through euphemism are myriad. Nevertheless, the point, the bonus,
the loan fee, the placement fee, the loan commission, the brokerage fee
and any other charge that inures to the benefit of the lender as compensa-
tion solely for making a loan are all generally treated as interest. 80
The ubiquitous point system is an excellent example. It requires that the
borrower pay a bonus to the lender merely because the lender has con-
sented to the loan. Each point is one percent of the loan principal. The
calculation of points payable often bears little relationship to the term of
the loan; thus, the shorter the term, the higher the effective interest rate.
A "bonus" is defined as something paid to the lender in addition to what
.. See, e.g., Turner v. Boger, 126 N.C. 300, 35 S.E. 592 (1900).
.. E.g., Security Fin. Co. v. Hendry, 189 N.C. 549, 127 S.E. 629 (1925). The
rule is part of a policy against allowing counsel fees as part of the costs awarded
with recovery on an action. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Schneider, 235
N.C. 446, 70 S.E.2d 578 (1952).
... Jonas v. Home Mortgage Co., 205 N.C. 89, 170 S.E. 127 (1933).
.. Hollowell v. Southern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 120 N.C. 286, 26 S.E. 781 (1897).
The problem of proof facing the borrower who alleges a fee exacted by an institu-
tional lender to be illicit is formidable unless the charge is grossly excessive. It is
impossible to ascertain the actual cost of a collateral service to a large-scale lender
without its co-operation.
18 Id. at 287, 26 S.E. at 781. Building and loan association fines and dues have
apparently since been excepted from the usury laws by statute. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 54-22 (1965). But cf. Rowland v. Old Dominion Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 116 N.C.
877, 22 S.E. 8 (1895), which contains language indicating that such exemptions
would be unconstitutional. See note 17 szpra.
.. Shanks 335.
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is "strictly due" him. 4' When "points" or other such fees are added to the
legal interest rate, the result is "a profit greater than the lawful rate of
interest, intentionally exacted as a bonus for the loan of money."''
Certain other payments to the lender are also normally excepted from
the general rule as to fees because they are made in consideration of some
undertaking or concession on the part of the lender; i.e., they are not
consideration for the use of money. The lender may promise that future
advances will be available when needed, whereupon the borrower pays
a commitment fee in return. This amounts to a purchase and sale of the
right to borrow money in the future. 42 There is no reason to expect North
Carolina courts to treat the commitment fee as usurious so long as it be
found in a bona fide setting. Such fees are most often used in the con-
struction industry where obligatory future financing is a necessity. It
should be noted that the statute explicitly authorizing limited fees to be
charged by certain lenders provides that "no charge shall be collected
unless a loan shall have been made.' 1 43 This language may bar the re-
tention by those lenders of a commitment fee where future advances are
not in fact made.
When the borrower voluntarily chooses to repay a loan before its
maturity, he is frequently required by contract to pay a prepayment premi-
um. Most courts treat the premium as a charge for the privilege of pre-
maturely discharging the debt and not as interest.'44 The North Carolina
Supreme Court has faced the question squarely and ruled that the privilege
of prepaying a loan at a time advantageous to the borrower can only be
exercised by compensating the lender for the trouble he would incur
thereby and for the loss he would probably sustain from falling interest
rates. 4 ' Prepayment is naturally most attractive to the borrower in a
falling credit market. In the instant case a ten percent prepayment premi-
um was validated. The court emphasized that the borrower was under
no duress'46 to pay the premium and had contracted for the privilege to
prepay.
... Pugh v. Scarboro, 200 N.C. 59, 62, 156 S.E. 149, 150 (1930).
... Doster v. English, 152 N.C. 339, 341, 67 S.E. 754, 755 (1910).
142 Prather, Mortgage Loans and the Usury Laws, 16 Bus. LAW. 181 (1960).
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-141(3) (1965).
... See Comment, Usury-Prepayment Options-Interest on Voluntary Prepay-
ment Before Maturity Not Usurious Though Above the Maximum Rate for the
Year, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 712 (1968).
... Bell Bakeries, Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 245 N.C. 408, 96
S.E.2d 408 (1957).
' The court cited Smithwick v. Whitley, 152 N.C. 369, 67 S.E. 913 (1910), for
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A premium also is often payable by the borrower upon default. It may
be called "interest after default," "late payment fee," or "accelerated in-
terest."' 47 Stipulation in the loan agreement that the borrower will pay
this sort of fee does not violate the usury statute though it is in addition
to the legal interest rate. The excess charge is, however, penal and can be
"neither collected nor retained."' 48 Thus, where separate notes were
executed by a borrower for each installment due, the lender was not
allowed to collect interest beyond that already accrued when he acceler-
ated payment upon default. 49 This approach is in keeping with the North
Carolina court's general disfavor of such penalties.1 0
The sale of credit insurance is another route to additional profit for the
lender. When an insurance company lends money, it can require as a pre-
condition for the loan that the borrower purchase from it an insurance
policy. So long as the borrower pays the same rates as do other insureds,
the usury statute does not apply. Furthermore, the company can require
that the policy be assigned as security. 5 ' The insurer thus makes a profit
both on the loan and on the insurance policy. Institutional lenders are
also authorized by statute to act as licensed insurance agents.152 Some
lenders reap a significant portion of their net profit from commissions on
the sale of insurance. 3 Significantly, the North Carolina Supreme Court
recently held 54 that a lender can require a borrower to place credit in-
surance with the lender's insurance subsidiary and that the premiums
the general proposition that a debtor is not acting under duress when he pays a
price to exercise a privilege otherwise unavailable to him.
17 See Prather, Mortgage Loans and the Usury Laws, 16 Bus. LAW. 181, 192
(1960).
148 Ridley v. Jim Walter Corp., 272 N.C. 673, 679, 158 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1968),
quoting with approval Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1283 (1933). See Moore v. Cameron, 93
N.C. 51 (1885).
149 Moore v. Cameron, 93 N.C. 51 (1885).1
. See cases cited note 133 supra.
..
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-32 (1965). The premiums for such a required policy
were held usurious in Cater v. Life Ins. Co., 122 N.C. 338, 30 S.E. 341 (1898), and
in Miller v. Life Ins. Co., 118 N.C. 612, 24 S.E. 484 (1896), which resulted in the
enactment of this statute. The statute is applied in Cowan v. Security Life & Trust
Co., 211 N.C. 18, 188 S.E. 812 (1936). As to the constitutionality of the statute,
see note 17 supra.
"'1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-51.4 (1965).
.. E.g., forty-three percent of the income of North Carolina small loan com-
panies in 1951 came from commissions on the sale of insurance. Simpson, The Loan
Shark Problems in the Southeastern States, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 68, 80
(1954).
154 Huski-Bilt, Inc. v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 271 N.C. 662, 157
S.E.2d 352 (1967).
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paid are not to be considered in determining the presence of usury. 5
A reasonable extrapolation of this holding would indicate that the lender
who is also an insurance agent can require that he get the commission
for any credit insurance involved in a loan.' 56 The inherent opportunities
for coercion are self-evident.
Broker's Fee
"[O]ne who makes no loan but, as broker or agent of the borrower,
finds a lender and procures the making of a loan by him, has not received
usury when he collects a fee for his services. If, however, the lender him-
self charges a commission in addition to the maximum rate of interest per-
mitted by the statute, such charge is usury."' 5 7 This recent opinion by
the North Carolina Supreme Court demonstrates adherence to the gen-
eral rule regarding brokerage fees.' 5  An intermediary's fee is considera-
tion for services rendered rather than for the use of money. But, if the
broker be an agent for the lender, any compensation received by him will
be attributed to the lender as usurious.'5 9 This rule is normally based on
the theories that an agent whose purpose is to arrange loans for the
lender should be compensated by the lender and that responsibility for
an agent's acts should be assumed by the lender. 160
The status of broker is susceptible to use as an evasive device. An
insurance company deposited funds with a bank for a six percent return
and the bank loaned the money out at six percent annual interest plus a
"brokerage fee." These facts were held to raise no reasonable inference
that the bank was in fact a broker but, rather, an inference that the bank
had made a usurious loan on its own behalf.' Indeed, commercial banks
usually obtain lendable funds from their own sources of credit and then
relend them for a margin of profit. A bank may, however, be considered
an independent broker in a properly structured transaction. Where a
borrower specifically asked the bank to obtain a loan for him from an-
1 Id. at 669, 157 S.E.2d at 357, quoting Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1344, 1349 (1963).
' Other states have prohibited this practice by statute: e.g., NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 662.190(2) (1967) ("No bank shall act as agent for any insurance company");
N.M. STAT. ANNq. § 48-22-67 (1953) ("Requiring procurement of insurance from
a particular source as condition of a loan is unlawful.")
... Henderson v. Security Mortgage & Fin. Co., 273 N.C. 253, 263, 160 S.E.2d
39, 46 (1968). See Patterson v. Blomberg, 196 N.C. 433, 146 S.E. 66 (1929);
Nance v. Welborne, 195 N.C. 459, 142 S.E. 477 (1928).
"" See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 703 (1957).
... Williams v. Rich, 117 N.C. 235, 23 S.E. 257 (1895).1 00Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 703, 708 (1957).
'0 Swamp Loan & Trust Co. v. Yokley, 174 N.C. 573, 94 S.E. 102 (1917).
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other source and agreed to pay a fee "to cover all costs, commission, and
expense in securing said loan," the fee was not treated as usurious in-
terest.16
2
The Collateral Transaction
A lender may seek to enhance his profit beyond permissible limits by
engaging the borrower or some other party in a transaction ostensibly not
a part of the loan. But, wherever "directly or by indirection" an un-
lawful return has been knowingly taken or charged, the usury statute must
be applied." These machinations vary in sophistication and complexity.
Neither execution of a separate note, devoid of usury on its face, for
usurious interest 0 4 nor the simple expedient of assigning the note to a
third party0 5 has proved sufficient to avoid the statute. More exotic
devices have been more successful. The required purchase of credit in-
surance and the collateral sale and repurchase cases discussed above are
good examples.' 60 Both of these transactions were structured around the
corporate entity. In each case, the lender was allowed the protection of
its corporate veil because the party pleading usury failed to satisfy the
court that there was identity and unity of action between the lending
corporation and its officers or its subsidiary.1
7
Where the corporate veil has not been interposed, the collateral trans-
action and the loan have been treated as one. Thus, a bank requiring
a borrower to maintain with it a non-interest bearing minimum deposit
and in addition charging maximum legal interest on the loan is guilty of
usury.' "This kind of usurious agreement has been cast in various forms,
but the courts have invariably stripped it of its flimsy disguise, and
decided according to its substance and its necessary tendency and effect,
when the purpose and intent of the lender are unmistakable. . . . The
16' Life Ins. Co. v. Smathers, 212 N.C. 40, 192 S.E. 851 (1937).
1.6 Charles A. Riley Co. v. W.T. Sears & Co., 154 N.C. 509, 517, 70 S.E. 997,
1000 (1911).
16. Hill v. Lindsay, 210 N.C. 694, 188 S.E. 406 (1936); Ector v. Osborne, 179
N.C. 667, 103 S.E. 388 (1920); Beck v. Bank of Thomasville, 161 N.C. 201, 76
S.E. 722 (1912).
16. Overton v. Tarkington, 249 N.C. 340, 106 S.E.2d 717 (1959).
166 See Huski-Bilt, Inc. v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 271 N.C. 662, 157
S.E.2d 352 (1967); Sledge Lumber Corp. v. Southern Builders Equip. Co., 257
N.C. 435, 126 S.E.2d 97 (1962).
... Cases cited note 166 supra.
166 English Lumber Co. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 179 N.C. 211, 102 S.E.
205 (1920); Planters Nat'l Bank v. Wysong & Miles Co.. 177 N.C. 380, 99 S.E.
199 (1919).
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proper subject of inquiry is, what is the lender to receive, and not always
what the borrower is to pay, for the forbearance."'
6 9
WHAT LAW GOVERNS?
Credit that is unavailable to prospective borrowers in North Carolina
because of a low interest ceiling will often be furnished by financers from
states that permit higher rates. Some out-of-state lenders maintain
branches in North Carolina and solicit business, which is channelled to
the lender's home office. At the home office, negotiations handled by the
branch are approved and the formal indicia of contract are finally executed.
The agreement normally contains a stipulation that the law of the lender's
state is to apply to the transaction. Evidences of indebtedness and of
security interests in collateral are kept at the home office, which is desig-
nated as the place where repayment is to be made."
This arrangement has been held to exempt the loan from North Caro-
lina's usury law. "Where notes are executed in one State and payable in
another, the parties will be presumed to have contracted with reference
to the law of the place where the transaction would be valid .... -171 The
court further held that the contract was made at the place where the last
act necessary to its existence was done-the home office-and that, gen-
erally, the validity of a contract is to be determined by the lex loci where
it was made. 7 2 But, the lex forum is to be applied if the contract is
executed in bad faith to evade the usury laws or if the loan is secured by
realty in the forum state. Under both of these circumstances, North
Carolina's public policy is deemed to override the usual rule of comity
between states.' 7 3
In a tight credit market, where funds are not available at licit rates,
the borrower seeks out-of-state financing not because of a corrupt intent
... Planters Nat'l Bank v. Wysong & Miles Co., 177 N.C. 380, 388, 99 S.E. 199,
204 (1919).
10 Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 157 S.E. 860 (1931). See
Clarkson v. Finance Co. of America, 328 F.2d 404 (4th Cir. 1964).
1 1 Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 515, 157 S.E. 860, 862 (1931).
'"" An earlier case held an alleged usurious contract both made and performed
in Virginia to be subject to Virginia law. Hilliard & Co. v. Outlaw, 92 N.C. 266
(1885). The more recent decisions are not necessarily in conflict with this ruling
since it did not state a requirement that both agreement and performance take place
outside the forum state.
. Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 516-19, 157 S.E. 860, 864-
66 (1931). The usual rule of comity between states is demonstrated in Union Trust
Bank v. Ward, 202 N.C. 691, 163 S.E. 926 (1932) (per curiam), which held a loan
made by a bank in Tennessee at rates legal in that state to be non-usurious and
enforceable in the North Carolina courts.
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to evade the usury laws but because commercial necessity so dictates. By
like reasoning, the lender makes loans only from its home office because
of a need to supervise its credit policies. If this be the case, then few such
contracts are sufficiently contrary to North Carolina's interest policy to
invoke its usury law. 4 The real limiting factor is the rule that all loans
secured by North Carolina real estate are subject to local interest law.17"
Many, if not most, financing transactions involve realty as collateral . 70
AN APPRAISAL
The state of credit cost regulation in North Carolina is deplorable.
Existing legislation is devoid of rational pattern and is scattered through-
out the General Statutes. Any effort, short of reading every statute on
the books, to exhaustively study and catalogue these enactments is doomed
at the outset. 7 7 Exceptions to the general usury statute have not been
enacted through a studied approach to the important cost of credit prob-
lem. Instead, they have been ad hoc responses to stimuli provided by the
various special interest groups that have felt the squeeze of the six percent
per annum legal interest rate. There has been no legislative recognition
that each statutory exception embodies a decision of public policy allow-
ing a particular class of borrowers or lenders to engage in financing activi-
ties legal for it but illegal for others in essentially similar commercial
situations. Unreasonable discrimination is present with a vengeance when
the availability of credit at licit rates to a business depends upon whether
it is a corporation or a proprietorship, or upon whether it offers as col-
lateral accounts receivable or real estate. Legislators who would blanch
at the mention of price fixing for commodities other than money blithely
grant dispensations 7s from the general usury statutes at random without
serious consideration of the problems involved.
Not even a well-reasoned usury statute could successfully set an arti-
",' For cases where intent to evade the usury laws was found by the jury, see
Polikoff v. Finance Serv. Co., 205 N.C. 631, 172 S.E. 356 (1934); Ripple v. Mort-
gage & Accept. Corp., 193 N.C. 422, 13-7 S.E. 156 (1927).
" Meroney v. Atlanta Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 116 N.C. 882, 21 S.E. 924 (1895).
Usury does not affect the validity of a mortgage as to the principal amount of the
underlying obligation. Rogers v. Booker, 184 N.C. 183, 113 S.E. 671 (1922).
8As to conflict of laws and usury, see generally Annot., 125 A.L.R. 482 (1940).
The N.C. GEx. STAT. Index (1965) is far from comprehensive as to its
"usury" and "interest" headings and should not be relied upon.178 Ironically, in view of usury's ecclesiastic origins, the latest dispensation,
granted by the North Carolina General Assembly as this comment went to press,
reportedly allows churches to borrow at seven percent per annum interest. Charlotte
(N.C.) Observer, Mar. 8, 1969, § A, at 9, col. 4.
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ficially low price for money as long as the economic law of supply and
demand operates to drive the market rate above that price.179 When this
occurs, the usury law creates a classic dilemma. If the statute is obeyed
and alternative avenues of investment are available for potential lenders,
credit sources both within and without the state dry up with a resulting
atrophy of economic growth.80 If the statute is ignored, disrespect for
the law' is fomented in legitimate commercial circles and unscrupu-
lous lenders enter the market.'" 2 The latter horn of the dilemma is often
chosen because usury is regarded as purely malum prohibitum and carries
no moral opprobrium. 3 Risk of loss from statutory penalties is treated
as a burden of doing business and is passed along to the borrower through
increased financing charges.8 4 There is, however, little risk of loss since
few usury actions arise out of the many financing transactions that take
place. Few borrowers have the temerity to offend financers whom they
must approach for credit in the future.'
8 5
Despite protestations that substance must control form, the North
Carolina courts have created exemptions from the usury laws by drawing
distinctions based purely upon form. The most significant example is
the time price doctrine distinguishing credit sales from loans. While these
decisions have allowed free credit flow where commercially expedient, they
have not contributed to predictability and certainty in financial planning.
Though credit dealings may often be structured to avoid interest limits,
... E.g., Shanks 329.
... Prather, Mortgage Loans and the Usury Laws, 16 Bus. LAW. 181, 196 (1960).
Prather advises mortgage lenders in low interest rate states to buy loans in other
states where permissible rates are higher.
1.1 Disregard for the usury laws is not a new phenomenon. Clark, C.J., con-
curring in MacRackan v. Bank of Columbus, 164 N.C. 24, 80 S.E. 184 (1913), had
the following to say about a bank adjudged guilty of usury: "It is astonishing that
those who are indebted for the protection of their property and their business entirely
to the respect which the people shall show to the law should thus inculcate by
their daily conduct contempt for the law. The law against usury is as much the
law of the state, and to be respected as such, as the law against burglary and
larceny." Id. at 39, 80 S.E. at 190.
182 Shanks 329-31.
18. Collins, Evasion and Avoidance of Usury Laws, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
54, 56 (1941).
284 Id.
... Many usury actions are brought by trustees in bankruptcy, receivers and other
fiduciaries who are duty bound to assert all claims and defenses. See, e.g., Clarkson
v. Finance Co. of America, 328 F.2d 404 (4th Cir. 1964); Polikoff v. Finance
Serv. Co., 205 N.C. 631, 172 S.E. 356 (1934); Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co.,
200 N.C. 511, 157 S.E. 860 (1931); Ripple v. Mortgage & Accept. Corp., 193 N.C.
422, 13-7 S.E. 156 (1927) ; Charles S. Riley & Co. v. W.T. Sears & Co., 154 N.C.
509, 70 S.E. 997 (1911).
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such planning is necessarily speculative. A particular avoidance device
may or may not perform its function if challenged. There is no quick and
effective way that the parties to a credit transaction can determine which
of the melange of usury rules is relevant to their problem.
The oft-proclaimed purpose of usury law has been protection of the
borrower. Because they do not meaningfully discriminate between bor-
rowers who need protection and borrowers who do not, current attempts to
regulate the price of money fall far short of this goal.' 80 Without rational
bases in the needs of a complex credit economy, usury laws are neither
respected nor obeyed.
CONCLUSION
Only thorough statutory reform can untangle North Carolina's convo-
luted scheme of credit cost regulation. The General Assembly must enact
measures that take a unified, functional approach to the problem, empha-
sizing economic realities rather than purely formal distinctions. A new
credit regulation statute should disregard meaningless differences in form
such as those that support the corporate exception and the time price doc-
trine. Indeed, it should avoid altogether the classification of transactions
under rigid rules that allow creditors to evade public policy as to credit
cost through clever subterfuge. Most importantly, a new statute must
recognize the futility of artificially low rate ceilings.
The most recent and most comprehensive proposal for state action
regarding the usury problem is the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.'17 It
seeks to eliminate credit cost controls for "knowledgeable and sophisticated
credit recipients" and to protect "less knowledgeable and less sophisticated
credit recipients" through, inter alia, disclosure requirements, ceilings on
credit costs to eliminate overreaching, and administrative remedies for
redress against creditors.' To accomplish these ends, the Code simply
draws new rigid lines. For example, all business-purpose loans or credit
sales of more than twenty-five thousand dollars as well as all credit sales
and loans to corporations are subject to no statutory ceiling.'8 9 A basic
maximum rate of eighteen percent per annum is set for consumer, agricul-
"'8 This is not to say that usury law is completely ineffective as a tool for pro-
tection of the naive consumer. See, e.g., Ridley v. Jim Walter Corp., 272 N.C. 673,
"158 S.E.2d 869 (1968), where a shell home builder was restrained from foreclosing
a real estate mortgage because of a usurious attempt to collect "accelerated" interest.
"'UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (Rev. Final Draft Nov. 1968).
... Id. Prefatory Note.
289 Id. § 2.605.
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tural, and small business loans or credit sales. 9 ' These rules seem to
assume that a consumer or small businessman is always unsophisticated and
that one who obligates himself for large sums or who operates a corpora-
tion is necessarily knowledgeable as to credit matters. They are likely
to prove as dysfunctional in practice as those rules that they are intended
to replace, for it cannot be said that no overreaching occurs in credit trans-
actions beyond a certain magnitude nor can it be reasonably asserted that
rate limitations are universally desirable in consumer credit transactions.
A better solution to the usury problem in North Carolina is a legislative
program characterized by flexibility and by commercial viability. The fol-
lowing statutory changes should be considered for inclusion in any such
program. First, full disclosure should be required in all credit dealings.
Congress has already acted to assure the consumer sufficient information
to make an intelligent choice among the sources of credit available to him.
The Consumer Credit Protection Act,' which becomes effective July 1,
1969, does not attempt to regulate credit charges, but leaves this task to the
state.'92 Second, the North Carolina Consumer Finance Act 9 3 should per-
haps be broadened to regulate all lenders who regularly lend in amounts of
less than two thousand dollars and to regulate all those sellers whose net
profit results substantially from the extension of credit. The Act, as so
revised, should be vigorously enforced by an adequate administrative body.
Its purpose would be to supervise creditors who habitually deal with those
consumers most susceptible to credit abuses-the lower income groups.
Finally, the courts should be given an explicit statutory mandate to enforce
"oo Id. § 3.201.
... Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 et seq.
... The Consumer Credit Protection Act is implemented by Proposed Federal
Reserve Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1968).
[T]he purpose of the Act... is to assure that every customer who has need
for loan or sale credit for personal, family, household, or agricultural pur-
poses is given meaningful information as to the cost of credit, in most cases
expressed in dollars of finance charge and an annual percentage rate com-
puted on the declining unpaid balance. Other relevant terms must also be
disclosed so that the customer may readily compare the various credit terms
available to him and use consumer credit on an informed basis to his best
advantage .. . [under the Act] a customer has a right to cancel a credit
transaction which involves a lien on his residence, other than a purchase
money first lien, and void that lien without any liability by notifying the
creditor of his cancellation within three business days. All advertising of
consumer credit terms must comply with specific standards, and certain
credit terms may not be advertised unless they are made available to all
who qualify.
Id. § 226.1.
.
9 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-164 to -191 (1965), as amended (Supp. 1967).
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a public policy against unconscionability and overreaching in any credit
transaction.' A trial court could weigh all the circumstances surrounding
a transaction in light of current economic conditions and thus determine
whether the profit reserved was palpably unfair as well as the result of
unconscionable activity by the creditor. The court's finding of unconscion-
able usury should carry a penalty severe enough to make such practices
unprofitable, but not so severe as to make the courts reluctant to impose
them.
Such a statutory scheme of complete' disclosure, of continuing regula-
tion where most needed and of flexible enforcement of public policy would
not become a stultified vestige of the past, as has the present law, but
would conform itself to the changing economic needs of the future.
DAVID MCDANIEL MOORE II
Antitrust-"Cross-Media" Ownership and the Antitrust Laws-
A Critical Analysis and a Suggested Solution
INTRODUCTION
For many years newspapers have owned broadcast stations' competing
in the same metropolitan area, but only recently has concern been ex-
19 Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Whether a mean-
ingful choice is present in a particular case can only be determined by con-
sideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. . . . The
manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this considera-
tion....
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Corbin suggests the test should be whether the terms are "so extreme as to appear
unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time and place."
1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (1963). In this connection, it should be noted that
the North Carolina General Assembly omitted U.C.C. § 2-302, which enacts the un-
conscionability doctrine as to sales, from the North Carolina version of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1-101 to -10-107 (1965), and that
the North Carolina Supreme Court has never explicitly applied the unconscion-
ability doctrine. An early decision stated that equity would set aside a contract
"grossly against conscience or grossly unreasonable." Barnett v. Spratt, 39 N.C.
171, 174 (1845) (dictum). A later case has produced a result, based upon con-
sideration theory, which seems justifiable only upon grounds of unconscionability.
Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, 192 N.C. 330, 135 S.E. 141 (1926).
1 The broadcast media under consideration will be AM and FM radio and VHF
and UHF television. The "duopoly" rules adopted by the FCC restrict ownership
by one person of AM, FM, and television stations to one station of each type in
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